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How CO2 capture and storage can mitigate carbon leakage
Abstract
Most CO2 abatement policies reduce the demand for fossil fuels and therefore their price in
international markets. If these policies are not global, this price decrease raises emissions in
countries without CO2 abatement policies, generating “carbon leakage”. On the other hand, if
the countries which abate CO2 emissions are net fossil fuel importers, they benefit from this
price decrease, which reduces the abatement cost. In contrast, CO2 capture and storage (CCS)
does not reduce fossil fuel demand, therefore it generates neither this type of leakage nor this
negative feedback on abatement costs. We quantify these effects with the global hybrid
general equilibrium model Imaclim-R and show that they are quantitatively important. Indeed,
for a given unilateral abatement in OECD countries, leakage is more than halved in a scenario
with CCS included among the abatement options, compared to a scenario prohibiting CCS.
We show that the main reason for this difference in leakage is the above-mentioned
international fossil fuel price feedback. This article does not intend to assess the desirability of
CCS, which has many other pros and cons. It just identifies a consequence of CCS that should
be taken into account, together with many others, when deciding to what extent CCS should
be developed.
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1. Introduction
It is unusual – and generally inopportune – to start a paper by explaining what it does not deal
with. Yet, when an article includes in its title both “CO2 capture and storage” (thereafter CCS)
and “carbon leakage”, the reader may well think that it is about the risk of CO2 leaking from
underground reservoirs to the atmosphere. This is not the case here: the carbon leakage we
deal with is the increase in emissions in foreign countries due a unilateral – or at least nonglobal – climate policy (Manne and Rutherford, 1994; Paltsev, 2001; Kuik and Gerlagh,
2003). What is the connection between this kind of leakage and CCS? The main carbon
leakage channel (at least in most economic models) is the so-called “international energy
price channel”, which works as follows. Most CO2 emissions abatement options (energy
savings, nuclear energy and renewable energies) reduce the demand for fossil fuels, hence
their price in international markets. If these options are applied in only one part of the world,
this increases the consumption of fossil fuels, hence emissions, in the rest of the world,
creating carbon leakage. In contrast, CCS does not reduce the demand for fossil fuels.
Furthermore, for a given amount of electricity generation, CCS increases fossil fuel
consumption: in a survey of the technical literature about CCS in electricity generation, Kober
and Blesl (2010) find an efficiency loss ranging from 3% to 14%, with an average of 8%.
Therefore, the development of CCS in a part of the world, rather than generating leakage,
might push the fossil fuel prices up, generating additional abatement in the rest of the world,
i.e. a negative leakage. Admittedly, since CCS cannot abate all CO2 emissions, a climate
policy which includes CCS will typically not generate a negative leakage; yet, leakage will
likely be lower than under a climate policy which does not include CCS.
This potentially mitigating impact of CCS on leakage has already been mentioned in the
literature by a few authors (Fölster and Nyström, 2010; Marschinski et al., 2009; Quirion,
2010a). Yet, to our knowledge, it has never been quantified. This is unfortunate since CCS
accounts for an important share of abatement in many ambitious climate change mitigation
scenarios (Fisher and Nakicenovic (eds.), 2007). Moreover, most published estimates of
carbon leakage, surveyed e.g. by Dröge et al. (2009) or Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) are based on
models which do not include CCS. These estimates are thus higher than what they would be,
ceteris paribus, would CCS be included as a CO2 abatement option.
Moreover, be it in the EU, the US, Japan or Australia, the policy debate about leakage focuses
on the “competitiveness channel”, which is due to the potential loss in market shares of
domestic installations, which face a carbon price while their foreign competitors do not. Yet,
in most economic models, the main carbon leakage channel is not the competitiveness
channel but the international energy price channel (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007). This conclusion
is important since the main policy options adopted or proposed to tackle carbon leakage, like
output-based allowances (Quirion, 2009) and border adjustments (Monjon and Quirion,
2010), can only mitigate the competitiveness leakage channel, not the international energy
price channel. If policy makers are serious and consistent about tackling leakage, they should
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also consider the international energy price channel and take into account, when choosing the
technical options mobilised to abate emissions, their impact on leakage.
In the present paper, we quantify for the first time (at our knowledge) the influence of CCS on
carbon leakage, using the global hybrid general equilibrium model Imaclim-R. This model
has been used in several peer-reviewed articles in recent years: cf. Crassous et al. (2006),
Guivarch et al. (2009, 2010), Hamdi-Cherif et al. (2010), Mathy and Guivarch (2010),
Rozenberg et al. (2010) and Sassi et al. (2010).
In this aim, we compare a scenario with CCS to another without CCS. The scenarios are
intentionally very stylised, in order to highlight the economic mechanisms at stake. Both
scenarios assume a climate policy in OECD countries only, with the same emission trajectory.
A price on CO2 emissions, which can be interpreted as a tax or as a cap-and-trade system, is
calculated so as to fulfil this emission trajectory. It turns out that the scenario without CCS
entails more than twice as much carbon leakage as the one allowing CCS. We show that this
difference comes mainly from the above-mentioned international energy price leakage
channel: when we exogenously set the fossil fuel prices at their business-as-usual level, which
blocks this leakage channel, then both scenarios entail a similar and much lower leakage.
This article does not intend to assess the desirability of CCS, which has many other pros and
cons. It focuses on a so far neglected dimension of CCS that should be taken into account,
together with many others, when deciding to what extent CCS should be developed.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the second section, we present the scenarios.
The results of the model with endogenous fossil fuel prices are presented in a third section,
while section four presents the simulations with exogenous fossil fuel prices, and section five
concludes. An appendix provides an overview of the model2.

2. The scenarios
For two reasons, we voluntarily favour simplicity over realism in the design of the scenarios.
Firstly, the aim of the paper is to compare contrasted scenarios rather than to assess “realistic”
climate policies. Secondly, the outcomes of climate negotiations are extremely difficult to
forecast, so any climate policy scenario for the next decades is very uncertain.
We analyse two climate policies scenarios (one with CCS and one without CCS) and a
business-as-usual scenario. In both scenarios, a climate policy is implemented only in OECD
countries: the EU, the other Western European countries, Turkey, the USA, Canada, Japan,
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand3. The climate policy takes the form of a uniform tax
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More developed descriptions are available in the Electronic Supplementary Material of Rozenberg et al. (2010)
and in Sassi et al. (2010).
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We simulate no climate policy in Mexico and Chile although they are members of the OECD, because they are
grouped with the rest of Latin America in the model. Also, we assume a climate policy in the entire EU although
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(or a cap-and-trade system with auctioned emission allowances) on all CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel combustion, from 2013 onwards. The tax rate trajectory is set in order to match the
same emission trajectory in both scenarios. OECD emissions peak in 2013 and decrease
thereafter until the end of the simulations in 2050, year in which they are halved compared to
2001 (Figure 1). Revenues from taxes on households’ direct emissions are rebated lump-sum
to households, while revenues from taxes on each sector emissions are rebated to this sector
as a production subsidy. This is not the least-cost way of using tax revenues, since using them
to cut pre-existing tax distortions would be wiser (Goulder et al., 1997). However, this would
require a specific approach in each region of the model and would complicate the scenarios
and the interpretation of the results.
Finally, for simplicity, we assume out the climate policies that have already been
implemented, like the EU ETS.

Figure 1. CO2 emissions in OECD countries
16
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Gt CO2
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8
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4
2
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no_CCS
CCS
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CCS does not apply to diffuse emissions from transport4 and heating, and is only one option
mobilised among others (energy savings, renewable and nuclear energies) in our CCS
scenario. In this scenario, over 2013-2050, 17% of OECD CO2 emissions are captured and
stored, and CCS accounts for 43% of OECD abatement. These ratios increase progressively
over the period: CCS starts in 2016 at a very low level and growths steadily so that 34% of
OECD CO2 emissions are captured and stored in 2050.

some new Member States are not yet members of the OECD, since these countries also apply EU climate
policies.
4

Except indirectly, since electricity produced in power stations equipped with CCS can be used in electric
vehicles.
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3. Quantification of leakage with and without CCS
As shown in Figure 2, when CCS is available, the CO2 price increases progressively to reach
$100 around 2025 and stays at this level thereafter5. At this CO2 price, CCS becomes
profitable enough to be applied at a large scale, which explains the price stability. Conversely,
when CCS is prohibited, more costly options have to be applied and the CO2 price reaches
$500/t CO2 around 2025. From 2025 to 2035 the CO2 price goes down because the old CO2intensive capital is progressively replaced by new, less CO2-intensive capital so a lower CO2
price (around $200) is enough to fulfil the emission target.

Figure 2. CO2 price
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Figure 3 displays the CO2 emissions in non-OECD countries. In both climate policy
scenarios, these emissions are higher than in the BAU one, the difference being the absolute
level of carbon leakage.

5

All costs are expressed in US dollars from year 2001, the calibration year of the model.
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Figure 3. CO2 emissions in non-OECD countries
30
25

Gt CO2

20
15

BAU
10

no_CCS
CCS

5

2050

2048

2046

2044

2042

2040

2038

2036

2034

2032

2030

2028

2026

2024

2022

2020

2018

2016

2014

2012

2010

0

The leakage-to-reduction ratio, or leakage rate, i.e. the increase in emissions in non-OECD
countries (compared to the BAU scenario) divided by the emission decrease in OECD
countries, averaged over 2013-2050, reaches 37% in the no_CCS scenario vs. 16% in the CCS
scenario. In other words, leakage in the CCS scenario reaches only 44% (16/37) 6 of its value
in the no_CCS scenario.
Although lower than in the CCS scenario, leakage is positive in no_CCS for two reasons.
Firstly, as mentioned above, even in the CCS scenario CCS accounts for only 43% of OECD
abatement. The rest of abatement is due to options that reduce fossil fuel consumption, mainly
energy savings and renewable energies. These abatement options generate leakage through
the international energy price channel. Secondly, a part of leakage comes from other leakage
channels, including the competitiveness channel mentioned in the introduction.
Figure 4 displays the production and price of the three fossil fuels included in the model: coal,
oil and natural gas. In both climate policy scenarios, coal production and price are lower than
in BAU, but the difference is larger in no_CCS since the decrease in coal demand from
OECD countries is higher. The same stands for oil price and production, although the
difference among scenarios is lower, because more abatement takes place in coal-consuming
sectors like electricity generation than in oil-consuming sectors like transportation.
The impact on the gas market is more complex: in the first decades, gas production is boosted
by climate policies which generate a switch from coal to gas, but as the emission targets
become more stringent, emissions from the combustion of natural gas have to be abated as
well, pulling gas production below its BAU level.

6

We are allowed to do this simple calculation because abatement in the OECD is by construction the same in
both scenarios.
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Figure 4. Fossil fuels production and price
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We now turn to the issue of abatement cost, approximated by GDP losses. The impact of CCS
on the cost of emission reductions in OECD countries is not straightforward (Figure 5).
Obviously, CCS reduces the abatement cost, as is apparent from the significantly lower CO2
price in the CCS scenario than in the no_CCS one. This explains why the aggregate cost for
OECD countries, expressed in GDP loss, is significantly higher with no_CCS in the first
decades. Yet, from 2033 onwards, the cost becomes lower with no_CCS. Moreover, from
2044 onwards, the cost with no_CCS becomes negative, meaning that GDP exceeds its BAU
level. Hence, without discounting, the cumulated abatement cost is not very different:
$65/t CO2 abated in the OECD with CCS, $72/t CO2 without (in US dollars from 2001, cf.
Table 2, first line). When we compare the cost of the scenarios per tonne of CO2 abated
worldwide, i.e. when we subtract leakage from the denominator, figures are higher and more
different: $77/t CO2 abated with CCS vs. $114/t CO2 without. Of course, discounting would
increase the cost difference between CCS and no_CCS.
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Figure 5. OECD cost of emission reduction
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The first explanation of the relatively low cost of the no_CCS scenario in the last decades is
that OECD countries benefit from the decrease in fossil fuel prices, decrease which is stronger
in no_CCS. The climate policy (especially without CCS) generates a rent transfer from fossil
fuel exporters to fossil fuel importers, which reduces the cost of climate policies in the latter
countries. The downside of the lower leakage entailed by CCS is that this option also lowers
the rent transfer from the (mainly non-OECD) fossil fuel exporters to the (mainly OECD)
importers.
The second explanation is that, in Imaclim-R, firms and households do not forecast the
increases in the oil and coal prices that take place in the 2040s in the BAU scenario, increase
which, for oil, is sharp around the date of the production peak, in 2041. More precisely, in the
model, when firms and households make their investment decisions they assume that the
fossil fuel prices will remain constant over the lifetime of the investment. If the fossil fuel
price increases (which happens in the 2040s, especially in the BAU scenario), the productive
capital of these firms is, ex post, too fossil-intensive. The CO2 price helps to correct this
myopia by encouraging economic agents to buy less fossil-intensive capital goods.
As we have seen, in a general equilibrium model like Imaclim-R, carbon leakage goes
through various channels. Moreover, since the model is non-linear, these channels are not
additively separable. Yet, it is possible to assess the importance of some of these mechanisms
by cancelling them. This is what the next section provides for the international energy price
channel.

8

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper566

8

Quirion et al.: How CO2 Capture and Storage Can Mitigate Carbon Leakage

4. Setting exogenous fossil fuel prices in order to explain the difference in leakage
between the scenarios
Two reasons explain the significantly higher leakage in the no_CCS scenario. Firstly, as
explained above, CCS weakens the international energy price leakage channel. Secondly, the
CO2 price is higher in this scenario, which reinforces the other leakage channels. In particular,
with a higher CO2 price, OECD CO2-intensive industries lose more market shares, reinforcing
the competitiveness leakage channel.
In order to disentangle these effects, in this section, we present simulations performed with
the same scenarios but with a version of the model modified in order to switch off the
international energy price leakage channel. In this version, the BAU scenario is ran with the
same model as in the previous section, but in the other two scenarios, the fossil fuels (coal, oil
and gas) price trajectories are exogenously set at the same level as in the BAU scenario.
Therefore we label these scenarios no_CCS_exo and CCS_exo.
As displayed in Figure 6, the CO2 price is slightly lower than with endogenous prices, because
in the latter case, the decrease in fossil fuel prices reduces emissions also in OECD countries,
requiring a higher CO2 price to reach a given emission target.

Figure 6. CO2 price with exogenous fossil fuel price
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As shown in Figure 7, emissions in non-OECD countries are now very close to the BAU
level, meaning that leakage is significantly reduced. Over 2013-2050, the leakage-toreduction ratio reaches 7% in CCS_exo and 10% in no_CCS_exo (cf. Table 1, last line). In
other words, leakage is divided by 2.2 in the CCS_exo scenario and by 3.9 in no_CCS_exo.
The international energy price channel is thus the dominant leakage channel in our model,
especially without CCS.
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Figure 7. CO2 emissions in non-OECD countries
exogenous fossil fuel price
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Table 1. Leakage‐to‐reduction ratio (2013‐2050)
CCS
endogenous prices
exogenous prices

no_CCS

16%

37%

7%

10%

Since fossil fuel prices are constant in these scenarios, the price elasticity of supply is infinite
and production is therefore more responsive to a change in OECD demand than in scenarios
with endogenous prices, in which elasticity has a finite value. Hence, the decrease in coal
production compared to the BAU scenario is higher (cf. Figure 8). The same stands for oil
production, although to a lesser extent. Natural gas production is very close to its level with
endogenous prices, except that in no_CCS_exo, after 2040, production goes back to its BAU
level instead of falling below it. The explanation is that with endogenous prices, at the end of
the period, the fall in coal price mitigates the coal-to-gas switch, which does not happen with
exogenous prices.
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Figure 8. Fossil fuels production, exogenous fossil fuel prices
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The abatement cost in OECD countries, measured by the GDP loss, is slightly higher than in
the scenarios with endogenous prices. As a consequence, so is the cost per tonne abated in the
OECD, but the cost per tonne abated worldwide (accounting for leakage) is slightly lower (cf.
Table 2). In other words, the flexibility of the fossil fuel prices reduces the cost per tonne of
CO2 abated if one does not take into account leakage but increases it if one takes leakage into
account.

Table 2. Undiscounted average OECD abatement cost per tonne of CO2 over 2013‐2050
(in US dollars from 2001)
per tonne of CO2 abated worldwide
CCS

no_CCS

per tonne of CO2 abated in the OECD
CCS

no_CCS

endogenous prices

77.3

113.7

64.9

71.8

exogenous prices

70.2

93.6

65.0

84.7

Conclusion
We have provided, at our knowledge, the first quantification of the impact of CCS on carbon
leakage. Assuming a carbon tax (or a cap-and-trade system) only in OECD countries, we have
compared two scenarios, one allowing and one prohibiting the use of CCS. The former more
than halves carbon leakage to non-OECD countries, compared to the latter. The main
11
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mechanism behind this result is that CCS does not reduce the OECD demand for fossil fuels,
hence does not reduce international fossil fuel prices (the so-called “international energy price
leakage channel”). Another, quantitatively less important, mechanism, is that the availability
of CCS allows reaching a given emission target for a lower CO2 price, which also reduces
leakage.
However, this ability of CCS to reduce carbon leakage comes at a cost: OECD countries are
less able to benefit from the decrease in fossil fuel prices, which mitigates the abatement cost
in fossil fuel importing countries.
Obviously, many other factors have to be taken into account when deciding the role CCS
should play in CO2 abatement. Among these, not least is the other kind of leakage, i.e. the risk
of CO2 leaching from underground reservoirs. However these other factors have already been
identified and discussed: cf. the IPCC special report on CCS (Metz et al., 2005) or, most
recently, Ha-Duong and Chaabane (2010) and Wuppertal Institute (2010). Since a global CO2
price is unlikely to emerge at least in the next decade, carbon leakage will remained an
important issue in the policy debate so we believe that fully informed public decisions about
CCS should also take into account the mechanisms we have quantified in the present paper.

12
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Appendix: model description
A.1. General features
Imaclim-R is a hybrid recursive general equilibrium model of the global economy divided
into 12 regions and 12 sectors (Table 3) and solved in a yearly time step (Sassi et al. 2010).
The base year of the model (2001) is built on the GTAP-6 database, which provides a
balanced Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the global economy. The original GTAP-6
dataset has been modified to (i) aggregate regions and sectors according to the Imaclim-R
mapping, and (ii) accommodate the 2001 IEA energy balances, in an effort to base Imaclim-R
on a set of hybrid energy-economy matrixes.

Table 3. Regional and sectoral disaggregation of the IMACLIM‐R model
Regions

Sectors

USA
Canada
Europe
OECD Pacific (JP, AU, NZ, KR)
Former Soviet Union
China
India
Brazil
Middle‐East Countries
Africa
Rest of Asia
Rest of Latin America

Coal
Oil
Gas
Liquid Fuels
Electricity
Air
Water
Other transports
Construction
Agriculture
Energy‐intensive industry
Composite (services and light industry)

As a general equilibrium model, Imaclim-R provides a consistent macroeconomic framework
to assess the energy-economy relationship through the clearing of commodity markets.
Specific efforts have been devoted to building a modelling architecture allowing easy
incorporation of technological information coming from bottom-up models and experts’
judgement within the simulated economic trajectories. The rigorous incorporating of
information about how final demand and technical systems are transformed by economic
incentives is allowed by the existence of physical variables that explicitly characterise
equipments and technologies (e.g. the efficiency of cars, the intensity of production in
transport, etc.). The economy is then described in both money-metric terms and physical
quantities, the two dimensions being linked by a price vector. This dual vision of the economy
is a precondition to guaranteeing that the projected economy is supported by a realistic
technical background and, conversely, that any projected technical system corresponds to
realistic economic flows and consistent sets of relative prices.
The full potential of this dual representation could not be exploited without abandoning the
use of conventional aggregate production functions like nested CES functions: it is arguably
13
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almost impossible to find mathematical functions flexible enough to cover large departures
from the reference equilibrium and to encompass different scenarios of structural changes
resulting from the interplay between consumption styles, technologies and localisation
patterns (Hourcade 1993). In Imaclim-R the absence of formal production functions is
compensated by a recursive structure that allows a systematic exchange of information
between:
•

An annual static equilibrium module with Leontief production functions (fixed
equipment stocks and intensities of intermediary inputs, especially labour and energy;
but a flexible utilisation rate). Solving this equilibrium at some year t provides a
snapshot of the economy: information about relative prices, output levels, physical
flows and profit rates for each sector and allocation of investments among sectors.

•

Dynamic modules, including demography, capital dynamics and sector-specific
reduced forms of technology-rich models, most of which assess the reactions of
technical systems to the previous static equilibriums. These reactions are then sent
back to the static module in the form of updated input-output coefficients to calculate
year (t+1) equilibrium.

Between two equilibriums, technical choices are fully flexible for new capital only; the inputoutput coefficients and labour productivity are modified at the margin, because of fixed
techniques embodied in existing equipment and resulting from past technical choices. This
general putty-clay assumption is critical to representing the inertia in technical systems and
the perverse effect of volatility in economic signals.
Imaclim-R thus generates economic trajectories by solving successive yearly static
equilibriums of the economy interlinked by dynamic modules. Within the static equilibrium,
in each region, the demand for each good derives from household consumption, government
consumption, investment and intermediate uses from the production sectors. This demand can
be provided either by domestic production or imports and all goods and services are traded on
international markets. Domestic and international markets for all goods – excluding labour –
are cleared by a unique set of relative prices that depend on the demand and supply
behaviours of representative agents. The calculation of this equilibrium determines relative
prices, wages, labour, quantities of goods and services, and value flows.
The dynamic modules shape the accumulation of capital and its technical content, they are
driven by economic signals (such as prices or sectoral profitability) that emerge from former
static equilibriums. They include the modelling of (i) the evolution of capital and energy
equipment stock described in both vintage and physical units (such as number of cars, housing
square meter, transportation infrastructure), (ii) of technological choices of economic agent
described as discrete choices in explicit technology portfolios for key sectors such as
electricity, transportation and alternative liquid fuels, or captured through reduced form of
technology rich bottom up models, and (iii) of endogenous technical change for energy
technologies (with learning curves).
14
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In this framework, the main exogenous drivers of economic growth are population and labour
productivity dynamics. However, international trade, particularly that of energy commodities,
and imperfect markets for both labour (wage curve) and capital (constrained capital flows,
varying utilisation rates of productive capacities), significantly impact on economic growth.

A.2. Energy markets and CCS in the Imaclim-R model
A.2.1. Oil
Oil markets are described in detail in Waisman et al. (2010). In particular, oil prices are
related to the utilization rate of oil production capacity (Kauffmann et al., 2004), which in
turn depends on the dynamics of both the supply and the demand side.
The main objective of the oil production module is to capture the drivers of short term
scarcity generated by gaps between demand and production which cannot be bridged
overnight given technical and economic inertia. Imaclim-R describes these determinants with
a high level of site specific details that include the amount of ultimate resources, cost profiles
of oil fields and the constraints on the deployment of production capacities.
To describe those deployment constraints, regional oil resources are distinguished according
to their cost of exploration and exploitation. Once the decision to initiate investments in a
given oil category is made, the pace of deployment of production capacities is determined by
inertias affecting the efficiency of exploration7. In line with Rehrl and Friedrich (2006), we
adopt the following dynamic equation to describe the deployment of production capacities
Cap for a given category:

Cap(t ) =

Q∞ .be−b (t −t0 )

(1 + e

)

− b ( t − t0 ) 2

This analytical expression corresponds to a bell-shaped symmetric Hubbert curve (Hubbert,
1962) differentiated across oil categories by its steepness and the area it delimits. The former
characteristic measures the intensity of the constraints slowing down discoveries and is
captured by parameter b (b=0.061). The latter one accounts for the amount of ultimate
reserves through parameter Q∞ (=3.6Tb in these scenarios).
At a given point in time, oil production capacity thus depends upon two parameters, the
previous decision to initiate exploration and the Hubbert curve that determines the geological
constraints affecting the exploration process. In Imaclim-R, the utilization rate of those
production capacities captures the level of tensions between supply and demand and affects
the profit margin on any product: the higher the utilization rate, the higher the scarcity rent
captured through a higher mark-up rate.

7

We assume a constant time-lag between discovery and production capacity
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Contrary to most sectors for which high unitary profit margin triggers investment decisions,
Middle-East oil producers have the latitude to refrain from investing, hence creating tensions
through an overutilization of their producing capacity, in order to better fulfill long term
objectives. This ‘swing producer’ behavior is coherent with past OPEC production which has
no longer fit the discovery trend since the 1970s oil shocks. In our scenarios, OPEC aims at a
short-term price of $80/bl. As for non-Middle-East producers (that are ‘fatal producers’), they
cannot but act as followers: they observe the current oil prices, and decide to launch
exploration campaigns of a category of oil as soon as it becomes profitable.
A.2.2. Gas
In the model, global gas production capacities answer to demand growth until ultimately
recoverable resources enter a depletion process. Gas prices variations are indexed on that of
oil prices via an indexation coefficient (0.68, see equation below) calibrated on the World
Energy Model of the IEA (2007). When oil prices increase by 1%, gas prices increase by
0.68%. This indexation disappears when oil prices reach $80/bl.: beyond this threshold, the
evolution of gas prices only depends on production costs and possibly on the depletion effect,
which leads to a sharp price increase (due to an augmentation of the producer mark-up rate).
Gas price in each region at year t is equal to:
ref
pgas (t ) = pgas
⋅τ gas (t )

where:
ref
is the gas price in this region at year 1.
pgas

While gas depletion has not started, τ gas (t ) in each region is:
⎛1
⎝3

2
3

1
⎞
ref
⎠ wpoil

τ gas (t ) = 0.68 × ⎜ × wpoil (t ) + × wpoil (t − 1) ⎟ ×
where:
wpoil (t ) is the international oil price at year t;
ref
is the international oil price at year 1.
wpoil

Moreover, if depletion has started in this region, τ gas (t ) increases by 5% each year, regardless
of oil prices.
A.2.3. Coal
Coal is treated in a different way than oil and gas because of the larger amount of available
resources which prevents coal production from entering into a depletion process before the
end of the 21st century. We describe price formation on the international coal market with a
reduced functional form which relates price variation to production changes. This choice
allows us to capture the cyclic behavior of this commodity market. In these scenarios, coal
16
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price growth sensitivity with respect to coal production growth is quite high, so that the coal
production growth cannot be absorbed without prices variations.
Coal price in year t is equal to:
ref
pcoal (t ) = pcoal
⋅τ coal (t )
ref
Where pcoal (t ) = pcoal
⋅τ coal (t )
ref
is the coal price in this region at year 1.
pcoal

τ coal (t ) is defined as
τ coal (t ) = τ coal (t − 1) ⋅ (1 + α i ⋅ gcoal (t ))
world
world
Qcoal
(t ) - Qcoal
(t -1)
with gcoal (t ) =
- glim
world
Qcoal (t -1)
world
Where Qcoal
(t ) is the international coal production at year t.

glim is the production growth rate that would not lead to price fluctuation (we set it to 0.05%).
We distinguish upwards and downwards movements of production growth, in order to
introduce asymmetry in price response: we use α1 (=1) as the price growth elasticity to
production decrease when production growth is lower than glim and α 2 (=4) when production
growth is greater than glim .
1.4. Carbon capture and storage
The CCS technology is represented in the electricity sector and Coal-To-Liquid production
(see 1.5 below). The electricity supply module in Imaclim-R represents the evolution of
power generation capacities over time, which depends on the amount of capital available for
new investments and changes in fuel and factor prices. The model anticipates ten years
forward the potential future electricity demand, taking into account past trends of demand,
and computes an optimal mix of electricity productive capacities to face future needs at the
lowest cost, expecting that fuel prices will stay at their current level. Three technologies can
incorporate a CCS device: Combine Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT), Supercritical coal plant, and
Integrated coal Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC). Each technology is characterized by a
date of availability across each region, a level of energy efficiency, a capital cost when
arriving to the market, a technology learning rate, and maximum socially and technically
achievable market shares.
1.5. Biofuel and Coal-To-Liquid (CTL)
In our numerical exercises with the Imaclim-R modeling framework, biofuels (first and
second generation) and Coal-To-Liquid fuels represent the main alternatives to refined oil
over the 21st century.
17
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Biofuels: The penetration of biofuels in energy supply is modeled according to worldwide
supply curves published by the IEA (2006). They have been interpolated to integrate an
annual continuum of the curves between 2001 and 2100 into the Imaclim-R model.
Production potentials increase with time simultaneously with cost reductions thanks to
constant technical progress. These production potential increases are mainly due to maturing,
at middle term, of so-called second-generation technologies: the cellulosic-lignite branch for
ethanol and the biomass liquefaction branch for biodiesel. The penetration of biofuels on the
liquid fuels market depends on their competitiveness and availability. Both aspects are
calculated by equaling out the marginal production costs of each type of biofuel and the price
of fuel produced by the “classical” branch of refined crude oil, with an eventual increase due
to a carbon tax in the case of climate policies.
Coal-To-Liquid (CTL): As soon as oil prices exceed a threshold value pCTL8, CTL producers
are willing to fill the gap between total liquid fuel demand D(t) and the total supply by other
sources (refined oil and biofuels) S(t). Their production objective is then D(t)-S(t). But they
may miss this objective because of insufficient delivery capacity at a given point in time as a
result of past under-investments. Indeed, under imperfect foresight, a period of low oil prices
affects the profitability prospects of CTL and suggests postponing the investments in this
technology: CTL investments are driven by the current level of oil price at each date, and
cumulative investments over time are then a function of the sum of past trends of oil price as
follows
pcum ( t ) =

t

∑p

oil

i = 2010

(i )

.

The share s of the targeted CTL production that is actually realized given the constraints on
production investments is an increasing function of cumulative investments and, hence, of
pcum ( t )

. As soon as oil price exceeds pCTL , CTL production is then given by:

CTL ( t ) = s ( pcum (t ) ) .[ D (t ) − S(t ) ]

A share of CO2 emissions due to CTL production can be sequestrated, as a growing function
of the carbon tax.

8

We take pCTL= $100/Bbl for all scenarios
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